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--------------------------------------------------~---
1. QUESTION: 
Why was it necessary to agree to a deferred payment arrange-
ment instead or lease? 
ANSWER: 
The United States was willing to lease enriched uranium to 
Euratom on the same terms and conditions as are available 
domestically. The Community, however, stated that at this 
time it was unable to lease special nuclear materials because, 
as a· political and legal matter, under its treaty it m.ust 
have ownerohip of special nuclear materials witb1n the 
Community. 
In order to retain the financial incentives provided by 
lease, but at the same time not undermine ownership which 
EURATOM feels is essential to effective control, the proposed 
plant of deferral of' payment f'or the initial inventory was 
developed. EURATOM intends to lease to the utilities uranium 
purchased under terms comparable to those in this country. 
2. QUESTION: 
Under the proposed program, the United States essentially 
would reserve a very substantial quantity or special nuclear 
material, namely, 30,000 kilograms of U-235, for EURATOM. 
Is EURATOM under any obligation to actually purchase the 
quantity that has been reserved? 
ANSWER: 
The fact that the United States would "reserve" 30,000 
kilograms of U-235 f'or the program should not be construe6 
to mean that this much material would be taken out of 
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production channels and set aside for this purpose, The 
objective of reserving this amount of material is to assure 
EURATOM, and EURATOM utilities, that enriched uranium will 
be available as required to fuel the reactors in which they 
have invested large sums ot their own money. The material 
will be removed from AEC production channels and transferred 
to EURATOM only as required. The sales contract, under 
which the material will be transferred for each reactor, 
will contain a schedule of deliveries and returns which 
will obligate EURATOM to purchase the quantities set forth 
in such Agreements. 
3. Q.UESTION: 
Why 1s there a limitation on the end use of any plutonium 
which may be purchased from EURATOM by the U, s. under 
the joint program? 
ANSWER: 
The proposed joint program with EURATOM is to be devoted 
exclusively to peaceful purposes. The restriction that 
has been placed in Section 7 ot the proposed "EURATOM 
Cooperation Act" on the end use of the plutonium acquired 
by the United States is designed to further underscore the 
civil nature of the program and is in keeping with the 
President's announcement of November 18, 1956 which stated 
that, plutonium produced as a result of material furnished 
by the United States and purchased by the United States 
would be used.solely for peaceful purposes. 
4 , QUESTION: 
How much U-235 is involved in the Joint program? Is this 
quantity really available? 
ANSWER: 
For the entire 1,000,000 kw program, the total inven~ory 




includes reactor loadings, material being fabricated, cooled 
and processed, The burnup will be about 1,000 kg of U-235 per 
year. For the 20 years of operation, a total of 29,000 kg of 
contained U-235 will need to be supplied for inventory and 
burnup. To this quantity is added 1,000 kg of U-235 for research 
and test reactors associated with the joint program, thus the 
total figure becomes 30,000 kg of contained U-235. 
The U-235 will be made available, as required from current 
production, under determinations made by the President under 
Section 41(b) of the Atomic Energy Act covering allocations of 
U-235 to be made available for peaceful uses abroad. In making 
this determination, the President takes into consideration 
production capacity of the U.S. plants and the total requirements 
for this output. 
5. QUESTION: 
What assurance do we have that the proposed program of 
assistance will be sufficient to make the program go? 
ANSWER: 
The assistance offered seems to meet the objective of giving 
reasonable assurance that the program will go. While it cannot be 
guaranteed that the incentives of the proposed program will be 
sufficient to assure that 1,000,000 kw will be installed, we 
believe they provide a basis for reasonable assurance that the 
objectives of the program will be attained. They were developed 
after careful consideration by the United States and EURATOM 
personnel of the extent to which European utilities should be 
willing to absorb costs greater than those estimated for new 
conventional plants. It was the consensus of the Joint Working 
Party that on the basis of the assumptions used nuclear power 
would cost 1 to 3 mils more than power from conventional plants 
and that European utilities would accept such costs in meeting the 
objectives of the joint program, provided there was established 
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a joint research and development program devoted to reductions 
in costs with the objective of reaching conventional costs at an 
early date. 
6, QUESTION: 
Are the assumptions and figures contained in the Wise Men 
report, 11 A Target for EURATOM 11 , still sound? 
ANSWER: 
The assumptions are still generally sound. Conventional 
power costs are presently somewhat lower than estimated in the 
report because of a decline in shipping rates for fossil fuel. 
The estimated nuclear power costs are also somewhat lower and 
more definitive than those given in the report. Mr. Armand, 
President of the EURATOM Commission, indicated in a recent 
statement that there will be some delay in meeting the goal of 
15 million EKW by 1967 given in the report. The proposed one 
million EKW joint program should be of material assistance in 
minimizing the delay. 
7, QUESTIOJ'!: 
Will EURATOM tend to favor public as against private 
industry'? 
ANSWER: 
EURATOM's responsibility is to further the development of 
atomic energy wi~hin the existing framework of existing industrial 
organization in the Member States. It has neither the desire nor 
the authority to alter this framework. Within the EURATOM nations, 
the production of electrical power ranges from one extreme, 
exemplified by Germany where practically all of the power is 
produced by private utilities, to the other extreme in the case 
of France, where the production of electrical power is State 
controlled, Between these two extremes lies Italy, where both 
public and private power groups are strong. EURATOM represents 
all countries and all factions. This should assure that neither 
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public nor private power will dominate the nuclear plants. The 
Memorandum of Understanding recognizes this situation and makes 
it possible for both public and private groups to participate. 
Under the selection process, the United States will not 
participate in the selection of areas or sites. This is primarily 
an internal political subject which must be resolved by EURATOM. 
It is interesting to note that during the six years of its 
existence, the Coal and Steel Community (an organization of the 
same six nations as EURATOM) has worked with hundreds of Coal 
and Steel firms without bringing one company under government 
ownership. As Mr. Armand put it in a recent interview in Forum 
Memo of the Atomic Industrial Forum: " ••• To sum up - EURATOM 
and the Joint program will not socialize industry but will 
bring it help and assistance without modifying its present 
structure ••• 11 
8. QUESTION: 
What is meant by "proven type" reactors? Who will interpret 
the meaning of this phrase? 
ANSWER: 
"Proven type 11 reactor is a reactor type which has been 
operated on a scale sufficiently large to give significant 
technical and operational data. Such operation will have shown 
that there are no major unsolvable technical problems, and that 
the reactor type is capable of reliable and safe operation and 
may be integrated into an existing power system. It is a reactor 
type which has been shown to be technically feasible and one in 
which the economic uncertainties lend themselves to resolution 
through the normal industrial process development techniques 
without dependence on major technical "breakthrough". 
Under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, as 
further clarified by an exchange of memoranda between the heads 
of the EURATOM and U.S. negotiators, it is clear that pressurized 
and boiling water types fall within the definition. It is 
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further clear other types (such as the organic moderated concept) 
that may meet the criterion will be eligible for consideration 
under the joint program. The development of the precise 
criteria and the determination of whether a reactor is of a 
"proven type" will be the responsibility of the joint EURATOM-
United States technical board. 
9. QUESTIQ!i: 
What evidence do we have that an assistance program of this 
kind is really needed? 
ANSWER: 
The development of a nuclear industry in most EURATOM 
countries has been relatively slow, up to now, for lack of 
practical experience both in construction and operation of full-
scale power reactor plants. 
In order to speed up this development, it is necessary: 
1. That the economic feasibility of nuclear power be 
proven, not by theory and calculation, not by extrapolation 
from pilot plant operation, but by full-scale operation of 
power producing units on a scale large enough to assure 
statistical reliability of the data; 
2. That the utilities, into whose grid the power from 
these nuclear plants must flow, become familiar with the 
technical and management problems of operating nuclear 
stations and accept, with confidence, nuclear power plants; 
3. That European equipment manufacturers gain knowledge 
and competence in the production of reactor components; 
4. That the various service industries, such as fuel 
production and fabrication, scrap recycle, irradiated 
fuel reprocessing, etc,, be developed as economic operations. 
Traditionally conservative and bound by rate ceilings, 
the utilities are not prepared to take excessive risks or to 
invest large amounts of capital in plants in which the costs of 
energy produced may be well above that of conventional stations. 
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The fact that there is not already underway a program which 
would accomplish the objectives of the joint program speaks for 
itself. Discussions with EURATOM and European utility personnel 
indicate that the estimated high cost of nuclear power from even 
proven type reactors and particularly the uncertainties of these 
costs would preclude a program under which one million EKW of 
American type reactors would be installed by 1963, unless 
additional incentives are provided. 
10. QUESTION: 
Aren't pressures for similar benefits apt to arise from 
other countries as soon as the program is announced? 
ANSWER: 
In formulating the program with EURATOM it was recognized 
that there may be certain other areas where the necessary 
conditions exist and the development of large-scale power reactors 
can be undertaken on a similar time schedule. Therefore it is 
believed that it may be in the interest of the United States, for 
technical and political reasons, to consider the establishment 
of a similar cooperative program to accommodate the special 
requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency, individual 
nations, or other groups of nations. The specific needs for such 
programs have yet to be determined. 
11. QUESTION: 
How does the proposed program with EURATOM relate to the 
Agreements for Cooperation which already have been negotiated 
with the various Member States of EURATOM? 
ANSWER: 
Article 106 of the treaty which established the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM} reads as follows: 
"Member States which before the date of the entry into 
force of this Treaty, have concluded agreements with third 
countries for cooperation in the field of nuclear energy 
shall, jointly with the Commission enter into the necessary 
negotiations with such third countries in order, as far as 
possible, to cause the rights and obligations arising out of 
such agreements to be assumed by the Community," 
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This obligation on the part of the Member States to negotiate 
with the United States to transfer their rights and responsibilities 
to EURATOM was recognized at the time we were negotiating agree-
ments with several of the Member States. Consequently, our 
bilateral agreements with these countries recognize this 
possibility. For example, Article II of the Agreement for 
Cooperation with Weat Germany reads as follows: 
"It is recognized that Article 106 of the Treaty 
Constituting the European Community for Atomic Energy 
(EURATOM) which the Government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, contemplates 
that member states of the Community will seek a re-
negotiation of existing agreements in the field of atomic 
energy with third countries once the Treaty comes into 
force, If the Treaty comes into force and if a cooperative 
arrangement is executed between the European Community for 
Atomic Energy and the Government of the United States of 
America, the Government of the United States of America 
would be prepared to arrange for the European Community for 
Atomic Energy to assume the rights and obligations of the 
Federal Republic of Germany under this Agreement provided 
the European Community for Atomic Energy could, in the 
judgment of the Government of the United States of America, 
effectively and securely carry out the undertakings of this 
Agreement." 
Theref,re, at such time as it appears that EURATOM is prepared 
to effectively carry out the undertakings of the Agreements for 
Cooperation and assume the rights and obligations, we would be 
prepared to enter into negotiations with the individual States 
to this end, It is not expected, however, that these negotiations 
will be undertaken until EURATOM has deveioped its longer range 
program which is to provide the basis fbr a subsequent comprehensive 
agreement with the Community. 
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12. QUESTION: 
What is the relationship of the United Kingdom to EURATOM? 
Why aren't they a part of the program? 
ANSWER: 
The United Kingdom is not a member of EURATOM but is a 
member of the European Nuclear Energy Agency. This is an agency 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and it 
includes Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turke~ and the United Kingdom, as 
well as the six nations which now constitute EURATOM. 
There have been discussions during the past months as to 
the relationship of the EURATOM members to the rest of the OEEC 
Agency, and it appears likely that EURATOM may participate as a 
group in certain ENEA projects, 
The United Kingdom has appointed its representative to the 
European Coal and Steel Community, Sir William Mecklereid, as its 
representative to EURATOM and has expressed its desire to begin 
discussions with EURATOM with a view to formulating a cooperative 
agreement. These discussions have just been initiated and it is 
too early to say what this future agreement will contain. 
The 11 Wise Men" report, "A Target for EURATOM 11 anticipated 
that the EURATOM program would include the construction of gas-
cooled reactors of the U.K.-type, as well as U,S,-type reactors. 
Therefore, it is recognized that the proposed program of 
cooperation with the United States represents only a part of 
EURATOM's power program. It is likely, on a longer-range basis, 
that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada all will 
work in cooperation with EURATOM, 
13. QUESTIOtr: 
What type of relationship is envisioned between EURATOM 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency? 
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ANSWER: 
The relationship between EURATOM and the IAEA, of course, 
is a matter for the two groups to decide, EURATOM is interested 
in cooperating with the Agency and its representatives took the 
initiative which led to informal discussions with representatives 
of the IAEA, 
In the development of the Memorandum of Understanding, the 
EURATOM group requested that the following phrase be inserted 
in the Memorandum: 11 ,,,The Commission of' the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the Government of the United States re-affirm 
their dedication to the objectives of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and intend that the results of their program will 
benefit the .f.gency and the nations participating in it .. , 11 
In addition, the Agreement for Cooperation between the 
United States and EURATOM recognizes that there will be specific 
cooperation with the IAEA in certain areas. For example, the 
Agreement states: 11 , •• In establishing and implementing its 
safeguards and control system the Community is prepared to 
consult with and exchange experience with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency with the objective of establishing a system 
reasonably compatible with that of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency ••• 11 , and, " ••• In recognition of the importance of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States of America 
and the European Atomic Energy Community will consult with each 
other from time to time to determine whether there are any areas 
of responsibility with regard to safeguards and control and 
matters relating to health and safety in which the Agency might 
be asked to assist ••• " 
14. QUESTION: 
What is the urgency tor Congressional approval of the 




As the President stated on June 23, 1958, the Executive 
Branch attaches a great deal of importance to the proposed Joint 
program and is most anxious to see it move ahead rapidly, There 
is a gvowing sense of.' urgency in the Community on the need to 
install a significant amount of nuclear power capacity in the next 
decade in order to stabilize Europe's dependence on conventional 
fuel imports. The joint program is considered a vital and urgent 
first step toward the realization of this broader objective. If.' 
one million kilowatts are to be installed under this program by 
1963, a start should be made on firm planning and selection 
during the summer and fall of 1958. Construction should begin 
in early 1959. Thus, if the program is to move ahead fully on 
this schedule, it will be necessary not only to obtain approval 
of the "124" International Agreement and the 11 123 11 Agreement for 
Cooperation, but also the enactment of.' the proposed "EURATOM 
Cooperation Act", which contains the basic authorities the 
Commission requires in order to carry out its obligations under 
the program. 
It is highly significant, if not remarkable, that the 
Community has been able to adopt the joint program as its f.'irst 
major piece of business, particularly since it only came into 
b~ing on January l of this year, In the past few months EURATOM 
has been very successf.'ul in mustering a mounting interest and 
enthusiasm in th~ European utility industry on behalf of.' the 
program. 
There also has been a significant increase in interest in 
reactors of.' American design in countries (such as France and 
Germany) where this enthusiasm did not exist bef.'ore. The net 
effect is that the Europeans are anxious to proceed with the 
program and the atmosphere is very f.'avorable, Reactions from 
American industry have been equally encouraging, If, on the 
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other hand, Congressional action on the entire program is not 
talcen during this session it is feared that the momentum that 
has been gained will be lost. It is quite likely that, in such 
an event, the Community itself would suffer a major setback during 
a very critical period when it is trying to get on its feet. In 
addition, the utilities involved might lose their interest 
entirely or shift their attention to reactors of other than 
American design, and the United States would lose its chance to be 
the first major power to closely assocj_ate itself with EURATOM' s 
program. 
The Memorandum of Understanding and the Agreement for 
Cooperation contemplate that a select number of projects (such 
as Edisonvolta) in an advanced stage of planning would be eligible 
for consideration under this program. Some projects have been 
delayed so far in their efforts to move ahead because of high 
initial costs and uncertainties associated with the fuel cycle. 
The proposed program could be of considerable assistance to these 
projects, and other projects involving u.s. reactors. A post-
ponement of final action until the next session of Congress would 
lead to further delays and could discourage European utilities 
involved from doing business with American industry. 
In recent months the British press has been criticizing the 
Government of the United Kingdom for not having had the foresight 
to initiate a Joint program of the kind that has been developed 
between the U.S. and EURATOM. 
The proposed program promises to result in immediate 
benefits of both parties. The sooner it is initiated, the sooner 
these advantages will be forthcoming. 
15. QUESTION: 
It appears that the proposed safeguard arrangements that have 
been agreed to by the United States authorities and EURATOM 
represent a departure from the safeguard provisions contained in 
most of the "power" bilateral agreements for cooperation which have 
been executed to date. How do the provisions in the EURATOM 
Agreement compare with those in a typical power bilateral? 
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Does the United States still have adequate tver-all assu~ance 
that the material transferred to the Community-as well as the 
special nuclear mat,erials J)roduced thercfrom only will be used 
for peaceful purposes? 
ANSWER: 
A~ the Department of State and the Commission have mentioned 
in their respective tes tir.10n+es the oafeguard arrangements 
formulated with EURATOM were designed to explicitly recognize 
the Community's unique attributes, ir;1portant responsibilities, 
and its capacity to establish a rigorous multilateral control 
system over the mntcrialsemploycd and produced in the program. 
We believe the arrangements agreed to are prudent and will 
provide us with ample assurance that the materials received from 
this country as well as special nuclear materials produced thereftcn 
onzy will be used for peaceful purposes. In anticipation of this 
question the Commission's staff prepared a comparison of the 
I 
arrangements incorporated in the proposed Agreement for Cooperatiop 
' with EURATOM with those contained in a typical power bilateral 
Agreement for Cooperation ( Appendix 11 A") which compares the 
similarities and differences between the two approaches. 
In summary, under the terms incorporated in the proposed 
Agreement for Cooperation the Community has agreed to set up 
a safeguards system according to a series of stated principles 
which have been fashioned in large part after those contained 
in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The 
Agreement provides that this system must be mutually satisfactory 
to the Community and the United States, It is further provided 
that the United States will assist the Community in establishing 
this system and will provide continuing assistance in its 
operation. Provision has been made for frequent consultation 
over the course of the Agreement so that the Parties may be 
assured of continuing effectiveness of the system and its 
conformance to the agreed upon principles. Within these terms, it 
has been agreed that each Party will have the opportunity to 
verify, by mutually approved scientific methods, that the other 
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Party's safeguard an control system, as it applies to nuclear 
materials transferred to the other Party or fissionable materials 
derived therefrom, is operating effectively. Lastly, continuation 
of the cooperative program is contingent upon the maintenance by 
EURATOM of a satisfactory system. 
In assessing the over-all import of this arrangement, the 
Atomic Energy Conunission and the Department of State believe it 
should be recognized that in the first instance it is contemplated 
that the Conununity and, not the United States, will be charged with 
the basic responsibility for assuring that the materials involved 
only are being used for peaceful purposes. At the same time the 
arrangements will provide the United States with ample 
opportunity to verify that the agreed upon system is functioning 
effectively, without any less assurance to the Commission that 
material subject to control under the Agreement will be utilized 
only for peaceful purposes. 
16. QUESTION: 
Do the safeguard arrangements provide us with essentially 
the same rights that we have in the existing bilaterals? 
ANSWER: 
If by rights one means - has the United States the express 
unilateral rights accorded the Commission under a typical power 
bilateral, the answer is no. On the other hand, if one means by 
rights - that the United States has ample opportunity to assure 
itself that material is being used solely for peaceful purposes, 
the answer is yes. This difference recognizes the Community's 
special status and broad responsibility, under the EURATOM 
Agreement. 
Briefly sununarize~ the provisions of the EURATOM Agreement 
in this regard are as follows: (1) The Safeguard system to be 
established by EURATOM ~ be in accordance with the principles 
which the United States and EURATOM agreed to. (2) This system 
must be mutually satisfactory, The parties have agreed that the 
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United States will provide assistance in establishing this system 
and Will provide continuing assistance in the operation of the 
system. (3) It is further agreed that there will be frequent 
-
consultations and exchange of visits by the parties to give 
assurance that the Community safeguards system effectively meets 
the principles agreed to and that the standards of the material 
acceptability system of the Community and the United States have 
kept reasonably comparable. (4) Within these terms it has been 
agreed that each party will have the opportunity to verify, by 
-
mutually approved scientific methods, the effectiveness of the 
safeguards and control system established by the other Party as 
it applies to nuclear materials transferred to the other Party, 
(5) Lastly, continuation of the cooperative program is contingent 
upon the maintenance of EURATOM of a satisfactory safeguard 
system. 
The United States'.perhaps could take the position that an 
interpretation of this Agreement permitted the United States to 
approach EURATOM on the basis of establishing a review system 
similar to that contemplated under bilateral agreements, However, 
this would not give a complete or accurate picture of the 
relationship envisaged. A review of the comparison and the 
history of the negotiations would clearly indicate that the 
provisions were drafted with a view that it is basically EURATOM's 
responsibility to establish and administer the safeguard system, 
The provisions relating to visits and consultations were designed 
to give assurance to the United States and EURATOM that this 
system would be effectively implemented and operated. In 
satisfying itself, the United States may verify the operation of 
this system by mutually approved scientific methods. 
We are firmly of the view that the United States is in a 
I 
position to adequately assure itself under the provisions of 
\ 




Does the Memorandum of Understanding provide that all of the 
so-called "know-how", including manufacturing techniques, in 
addition to plans, designs and specifications, which have been 
developed by American industry with private funds, must be made 
freely and widely available to European competitors? 
ANSWER: 
One of' the major purposes of the proposed program is to 
foster a close and continuing association between American and 
European industry. In formulating the program it was recognized 
that normal commercial relationships would have to be preserved, 
wherever possible to encourage industrial participation. 
Accordingly, the provisions of the Agreement~ not provide for 
any mandatory exchanges of manufacturing "know-how" or techniques. 
Exchanges of this kind are expected to be the subject of licensing 
and other normal commercial arrangements. 
With respect to plans, designs, and specifications it was 
recognized in preparing the Agreement that the program, in large 
part, was being proposed to provide Europe with a technological 
foundation, based partially on u.s. experience, for a longer range 
nuclear power program. Of equal importance, it was designed to 
afford u.s. industry with the invaluable opportunity to "prove out" 
its reactors, on a large scale basis, and obtain from the European 
utilities operating and cost information on these reactors. 
Accordingly, if the desired benefits were to be realized, on a 
wide scale basis, it was agreed that there would have to be a 
reasonably free and reciprocal exchange of information under the 
program. It was recognized that such an exchange, in fact, would 
be indispensable to the review of the reactor proposals submitted 
as well as the administration of the program, including the fuel 
cycle guarantees. Thus, for example, Article VI, A-1, of the 
Agreement for Cooperation provides that: 
"Under mutually agreed arrangements •••. all non-patentable 
information developed in connection with the selective 
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projects., oonoerning designs, plans and specifications, con-
struction costs, operations and economics will be delivered 
currently to the parties as developed and may be used, 
disseminated, or published by each party for any and all 
purposes as it sees fit without further obligation or 
payment," 
While this provision contemplates that information 
developed by American private capital will be disseminated 
under the program, it is felt that the terms are sufficiently 
flexible to assure that the exchange will be administered 
in a manner which is consistent with the objectives of this 
joint program. It also should be noted that information of 
this kind normally is made available to the purchasing 
utility and that, in the over-all, it is our belief that 
American industry will be gaining an ample return in the 
form of significant cost and operating data, 
18. QUESTION: 
What will the United States patent policy be with respect to 
American fuel element fabricators through whom the AEC extends 
fuel element guarantees? 
ANSWER: 
The Commission has not determined what patent rights, if any, 
it believes it should obtain with respect to patents developed by 
manufacturers covered by fuel element guarantees, If the Com-
mission decides to obtain any patent rights, such rights will be 
limited to use of such inventions and discoveries by the United 
States Government with respect to construction and operation of 
Government owned reactors. We believe this approach will assure 
that the Government obtains such rights as are necessary for its 
own needs and at the same time permit manufacturers to be in a 
position to license others to use such patents. 
Section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act provides that any 
invention or discovery useful in the production or utilization 
of special nuclear material or atomic energy made or conceived 
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under any contract, or subcontract, arrangement or other 
relationship with the Conunission shall be deemed to have been 
made by the Commission. Whether or not this section would be 
applicable to fuel guarantee contracts has not been determined. 
However, even if it were so determined the Commission would take 
such action under the waiver authority set forth in this section 
as would be consistent with the approach outlined above. 
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19. QUESTION: 
Why doesn't the proposed deferred-payment arrangement 
relating to the fuel inventory provide for a down payment 
by the Community at the time of initial delivery? 
ANSWER: 
We have considered the possibility of requesting the 
Community to make a down payment on the fuel inventory at 
the time of initial delivery. However, the objective is to 
keep the charges for enriched uranium comparable to those in 
the United States during the first ten years of operation 
when the EURATOM program will be getting underway. No down 
payment on fuel inventories is required in the United States, 
where the material is leased to private users. The deferred-
payment arrangement, outlined in the prepared statement, 
as a substitute for lease and is financially equivalent to 
lease during the deferral period. To require a down 
payment for the EURATOM program would upset the basis on 
which the fuel-cycle costs were estimated and would 
necessitate other compensating incentives to assure the 
success of the program. 
20. QUESTION: 
Was the program discussed with ·American industry before 
July 8, 1958? 
ANSWER: 
The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) came into 
.being on January 1, 1958 and the first formal meeting of the 
EURATOM Commission was held on February 18, 1958. At this 
first meeting the Commission recommended the formation of a 
Joint U.S. - EURATOM Working Party to develop plans for the 
joint program. This working party met in Luxembourg in March 
and in Washington in April and May. 
It was considered inappropriate to discuss the details of 
the proposed program with u.s. industry until there was 
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inturn~l pc'!icy tl.PPt'"6vn:l and ur.ti l the program was submitted 
to thu Joint Cor.u:~1 ttcc on 1\ toraic Energy. However.,· we did 
receive many comments and observations from u. s. industry 
prior to., and during the period of negotiations with EURATOM., 
on the problcmo which were: being encountered in attempting to 
sell tr.s. reactors abroad, and this information was of consider-
able value in developing the program. In particular on 
December 31., 1957, the Commission sent a letter to representatives 
of the nuclear power industry requesting information on diffir,11-
ties encountered in negotiating contra·cts for the sale of 
reaotorc :ibroad. 
On July 8, 1958 we held a meeting with representatives of 
U.S. industry at which the proposed program was discussed in 
detail, and we believe it was favorably received by this group. 
21. QUESTION: 
The exchange of letters and the testimony make clear.that 
the safeguard arrangements contain an element of reciprocity. 
Does this mean that we are undertaking a commitment to allow 
Euratom representatives to have access to U.S. classified 
information? 
ANSWER: 
The Agreement for Cooperation does not provide for classi-
fied information to be made available to EURATOM personnel, 
It does permit EURATOM to verify that plutonium produced 
in reactors under the program and processed or purchased 
by the United States will be used for peaceful purposes 
only. The United States will make arrangements to permit 
such verification with respect to chemical processing and 
peaceful uses without any classified information being 
involved. 
22. QUESTION: 
What is the status of third-party liability and indemnity 
coverage, and what would be the effect of any delay in such 




In the prepared testimony there is outlined briefly the 
undertakings of EURATOM with respect to this matter and 
their complete understanding of the need to solve this 
problem. As you know, the EURATOM countries are members of 
the OEEC which currently has under consideration a draft 
convention which would deal with the third party liability 
question. 
OEEC experts have been working steadily upon the draft 
convention, having had meetings in January, March and this 
month. They will meet again in September and hope to be 
able thereafter to complete such a convention to be presented 
to the member governments. We believe this is a most 
heartening indication of EURATOM's intention to deal 
e~peditiously with this problem. 
We have seen drafts of the convention and commented 
thereon. However, they are undergoing revision and further 
consideration. Basically, the convention would provide 
for liability in stipulated amounts on the reactor 
operations and adopt the approach that there would be no 
third party liability on the part of suppliers, including 
American suppliers, with respect to nuclear incidents 
arising in the signatory nations. We are aware, of course 
that whatever form the convention may take there may still 
be some problems. 
We believe, however, that the main thing to remember is 
that EURATOM recognizes that a convention might not be the 
entire solution to this problem and that indemnification 
of such supplier might be necessary by EURATOM, backed up 
by the member state. 
It is felt thatEURATOM's undertaking under the Agreement 
for Cooperation to secure adoption by the earliest 
practicable date of suitable measures in this respect,coupled 
with the realization that the program may not proceed on the 
agreea time scheduled if the third party liability problem is 
not solved, is a strong indication that it will be solved. 
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2 3, QUESTIONi 
How will the program be administered? What will be the 
relationship of the Department of State, the AEC., the ICA., 
and the Executive Office of the President in the administration 
of the Joint program? 
ANSWER: 
Both the AEC and the Department of State have been occupied 
with the substantive elements of the Joint program and we., 
therefore., have not had time to work out the a"ttninistrative 
arrangements needed to carry it out; a process which will 
require consultation with EURATOM officials, The development 
of administrative arrangements is clearly the next step. We 
expect to have a preliminary plan of operation by the end 
of August, and discussions with EURATOM officials in September. 
We assume that certain maJor operating responsibility 
will have to be focused in Europe, The AEC intends to assign 
a senior representative to the EURATOM headquarters., supported 
by appropriate technical personnel., who will work within the 
general framework of the United States M1ssion to the three 
Communities., which is headed by Ambassador Butterworth. 
In view of the fact that no Mutual ~ecurity funds are 
involved., the ICA is not involved in the administration or this 
program. 
With ravorable action by the Congress on the program, the 
next phase is one of organization., to be followed by actual 
administration of the program. These are phases of Executive 
operations outside the immediate interest of the Executive 
Office of the President., which is concerned with policy matters, 
Should maJor policy problems arise in connection with the 
joint program that require the attention of the Executive 
Office, then presumably the normal procedures would be 
followed, namely, a Joint recommendation by the Secretary or 
State and the AEC to the President for his consideration. 
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24, QUESTIONS 
What activities will be included in the research and 
development program? 
ANSWER: 
The need for a well developed extensive research and 
development program as a compliment to the construction and 
operation of the reactors envisioned under the joint u.s.-
EURATOM program was recognized by the Joint Working Party. 
The participating utilities want some assurance that the 
reactors, in which they will invest some 350 millions of dollars, 
have a reasonable chance of some day standing on their own 
feet as competitive power producers. The guarantees and other 
financial incentives offered for the first ten years under 
the program serve only to lim1 t the loss of the operators during 
the initial period. Without a vigorous research and development 
program, these units would probably not produce appreciably 
cheaper power after ten years than they would initially and, 
with the termination of the operational assistance program, the 
utilities would find themselves with expensive power 
generating facilities, 
The actual extent of the research and development program 
will, of course, be determined by the amount of useful research 
and development that can be done during the initial design and 
construction phase of the specific reactor projects that are 
chosen for the program and on those phases of the reactor system 
which lend themselves to improvement and modification after 
the reactors are part of an operating system. 
The attached list of types of work that can and must be 
done gives an idea of the scope of the expected program. 
With two, and possibly three, basic types of reactors being 
constructed, and with the variations that will be inherent in 
the six to eight actual projects under the program, and with 
the understanding that a major emphasis will be placed on full 
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scale testing, under actual operating conditions, of fuel 
elements, components, instrwnents, etc., the anticipated 
expenditure or 100 million dollars during the next five years 
is thought to be reasonable. Experience in this country has 
indicated that 5 to 10 million dollars of preoperational 
research and development is not unreasonable for reactors of 
the size contemplated. As a matter of interest, about 85 
million was spent on PWR, not including the reactor facility 
itself. To achieve the economical promise of the reactors 
constructed under the U,S,·EURATOM program an extensive 
post-operational program also is required and would be supported 
by this R&D fund. 
Since our experience with power reactors is somewhat 
limited, it is not possible to predict., on the basis of experi-
ence, how much research and development money can be spent on 
programs which will be expected to give a reasonable chance 
of a worthwhile pay-off. We have had a.bout 14 years of experi-
ence with the effectiveness of research and development on 
improvement of operation of our production units. On the basis 
of the dollars spent at Hanford and Savannah River and of the 
improvement on productivity, it is felt that expenditures 
of the order proposed are entirely in line with our experience 
and more importantly that the results which we would expect to 
obtain from those expenditures will go far toward achievement 
of economic nuclear power in the reactors under the Joint 
project as well as in all other reactors of similar type, 
Type of Developmental Activities Envisioned Under the Joint 
Program 
I.~ Cycle Studies: 
a. Methods of converting UF6 to material used as fuel. 
b. Development of new cladding for fuel. 
c, Optimization of fuel enrichment and geometry. 
d, Techniques for fabricating fuel elements. 
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e, Procedures for extending operating life of fuel, 
r. Minimizing problems or corrosion of fuel elements by coolant~ 
g, Irradiation tests of fuel elements in test reactors and in 
full-scale operating reactors. 
h, Optimization of heat transfer and nuclear performance of 
fuel, 
1. Improvement or fuel handling equipment and techniques, 
j, Methods of processing and re-using inactivated fuel including 
evaluation or degree of decontamination needed, 
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II. Moderator and Coolant Studies: 
a. Possibility of changes in moderator and coolant __ in--reactors: 
for example, heavy water for light water. 
b, Methods for clean-up and purification of moderator and cool-
ant. 
III. Control and Instrumentation Studies: 
a. Development of more effective control materials, 
b. Development of better mechanisms for introducing control 
material. 
c. Improvement of techniques of manufacture and fabrication of 
control unit. 
d. Minimizing corrosion of control rods by coolant. 
e. Irradiation tests on new control material in test and full-
scale reactors. 
f. Development of new or improved over-all instrumentation to 
make possible more stable operation under transient and 
equilibrium operating conditions. 
DI. Operational Efficiency and Safety Studies: 
a. Development of improved operating procedures to decrease 
costs, minimize maintenance, increase on-stream time and 
improve over-all operational safety. 
V. General Studies: 
a. Improvement of auxiliary systems and components so that 
improvements in reactor operation may be easily translated 
into decrease in unit costs. 
25, QUESTION: 
What use does the AEC plan to make of the plutonium purchasec 
under the program? 
ANSWER: 
We cannot at this time make accurate predictions of thG ultimatG 
needs for plutonium for non-military uses because its limited 
availability for such uses has, to date, made it impossible to 
carry out the extensive research and development which will be 
required to. assure that this material takes its rightful place 
among the,nuclear fuels of the future. 
The Commission in only now turning its efforts in a serious 
way towa~d the potential of plutonium as a nuclear fuel. It, 
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together, with industry must establish the special facilities 
needed for the chemical and physical handling of this highly 
poisonous material. Programs dealing with its chemical 
and metallurgical properties as well J.S with the techniques of 
handling it must be developed. Numerous alloys must be studied 
1n order to determine which is the most suitable for uses in 
reactors. large-scale experiments must be undertaken to 
determine the behavior of plutonium in its various physical 
and chemical forms under conditions of irradiation. Its 
stability and efficiency as a nuclear fuel must be determined 
by using it as fuel in various types of reactors under various 
conditions. 
As the program progresses, as data from one series of experi-
ments become available foranalysis, and as more and more 
reactor physicists, chemists and metallurgists turn their 
efforts in this direction, the scope and magnitude of the 
program will rapidly expand and with it will expand the need 
for material. Our present preliminary and tentative thinking, 
developed in the current period when plutonium .is looked upon 
as a scarce material needed for vital military pI'Ograms, calls 
for approximately 3300 kg during the next 15 years. We are 
convinced that as soon as plutonium is available in significant 
quantities for non-military purposes there will be a sizable 
demand for all the material made available for the purpo~e. 
I 
The long-range nuclear power program must be based on the 
' \ 
ultimate use of all available nuclear materials. Plutonium 
and U-233 must take their place with U-235 as an energy source, 
Before this can happen there must be extensive research and 
development programs con:m1tt1ng large amounts of these materials. 
It should be mentioned that the quantity of plutonium to 
be purchased by.the United States from.EURATOM to meet these 
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needs may be substantially reduced by the existance of the 
same types of needs in the member states. 
In addition to the obvious needs for developing and using 
plutonium as a nuclear fuel in power reactors, there is also 
the potential non-military use of nuclear explosives which is 
now in the very early stage of development. Should experiments 
which will be carried out under the Commission's Project 
Plowshare be successful, and there is every reason to believe 
that they will be,the demand for nuclear explosive devices could 
well become a very important factor in our nuclear planning 
and plutonium which is earmarked for non-military purposes 
could well find extreme utility in this manner. 
- 28 -
26. QUESTION: 
How was the figure of $135,000,000 for the capital loan 
arrived at? 
ANSWER: 
The Memorandum of Understanding provides that the u.s. loan 
would be up to $135,000,000. This figure was developed on the 
basis, and is meant to reflect, a reasonable estimate of the 
dollar value of U.S. equipment and services purchased for the 
reactors constructed under this program. 
Based on our understanding of proposals submitted by 
u.s. industry on reactor projects in Europe, 50% - 60% of the 
equipment and services (excluding civil works) would be 
imp~rted from the United States. On the basis of the total 
plant cost it ap~ears reasenable to expect that 35 - 45% 
of the cost would be for u.s. equipment and services. 




Fuel Handling Equipment 
Building and Site 
Instr. and Controls 
Reactor Core and Fittings 
Accessory Electrical Equipment 




Reactor Forced Circ. Pumps 
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Use (3) Tbru 6/30/57 FY 58 59 60 61 62 63 
Domestic Power (l) 
and R&D 40 l4o 130 390 150 50 100 
Commission R&D (2) 40 -20 65 40 10 10 10 
Recycle Power Reactors 0 0 0 0 0 20 30 
Fast Breeder Reactors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private R&D 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 
(1) Includes base program reactors such as EBR-II, PRTR, Lampre, & ZPR's 







(3) Table does not reflect requirements for Pu in the following applications: 
a. The use in existing power reactors as enrichment in place of U-235. 
b. New MTR' s and ETR 's operating with Pu loading. 
65 66 §1. 68 69 
100 100 100 100 100 
10 10 10 lO 10 
50 50 50 50 60 
30 50 50 50 50 
10 10 10 10 10 
c. LOan o:f material :for foreign power reactors operating on Recycle basis or as substitution for u-235. 
d. Loan of material to :foreign R ~ programs. 
e. Operation Plowshare 
:f. Medical uses 
1Q 71 E. n ~u1.. 
100 100 100 100 2000 
10 10 10 10 255 
60 60 6o 60 600 
75 75 75 75 550 
],.0 10 10 10 140 
3545 
27.QUESTION: 
Are one or two companies apt to get all the business at 
the expense of most of the industry~ 
ANSWER: 
In view of the size of the program and the target date 
of 1963, it is highly unlikely that one or two companies 
in the United States have the ability or capacity to provide 
all of the equipment, material, or services required. On 
\he contrary, we believe there will be a reasonable distri-
bution of the orders among the companies within the 





COMPARISON OF THE SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS OF 
THE EURATOM AGREEMENT .AND THE SAFEGUARD 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN A TYPICAL U.S. 
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION. 
-· '- --
EURATOM SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS: 
A. The Comm.unity undertakes the responsibility 
for establishing and implementing a safeguard 
and control system in accordance with agreed l.i.pon 
principles which are set forth in the .Agreement 
for Cooperation. This system will be designed to 
give maximum assurance that eny material, equipment 
or devices made available pursuant to the Agreement 
and a;ny source or special nuclear material derived 
therefrom shall be utilized solely for peaceful 
purposes. 
B. The Community undertakes the obligation to consult 
with the International Agency with the objec~ive 
of establishing a system reasonably comparable 
with the International Agency system. 
BILATERAL SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS: 
A. The safeguard provisions contain no 
express provisions relating to the type 
of safeguard system to be established by 
the nation. The U.S. however can require 
the maintenance a...~d production of operating 
records and call for reports to assist in 
assuring accountability of material. The 
implementation of this provision could well 
influence the type of accountability system 
established by the subject Government. 
B. There is no specific undertaking on the part 
of a nation to consult with the IAEA in 
order to design a system reasonably comparable 
with the IAEA's system. 
~ 
~ 
C. The United States and the Community have agreed 
on the principles which a.re to be employed by 
EURATOM in establishing a safeguard and control 
system and the Community is responsible for estab-
lishing and maintaining a mutually satisfactory 
and effective safeguard and control system in 
accordance with the agreed upon principles. 
D. The Government of the United States will assist 
EURA.TOM in establishing the safeguard system 
and will provide continuing assistance in the 
operation of the system. 
C. Bilateral. agreements contain no provisions 
as to the standard to be adopted by the 
subject government in establishing a safeguard 
and control system and there is no express 
requirement that such system be mutually 
satisfactory. 
D. There is no provision in Agreements for 
Cooperation which specifically provide for U.S. 
assistance in establishing the subject governments 
safeguard system. However, the U.S. does provide 
assistance under the information provisions of 




E. Under the joint program, the Parties will jointly 
approve the technical and economic f'eatures C>f' the 
reactors to be selected. It is expected that 
designs will be reviewed in this evaluation. 
Euratom will review and approve the design for 
purposes of assuring the inspectibility of' reactors. 
F. EURATOM must establish a safeguards system in 
accordance with agreed principles. One such 
principle provides that EURATOM will require the 
maintenance and production of operating records 
to assure accountability for materials and receive 
reports with respect to projects. The system 
developed by EURATCM based upon this principle 
must be mutually satisfactory. Visits and 
consultations are provided for to assure the 
system effectively meets the responsibilities and 
principles set forth in the Agreement and that the 
materials accountability systems of' both parties 
are kept reasonable comparable. 
E. The U.S. may, with the objective of 
assuring design and operation for civil 
purposes and permitting effective application 
of its rights, review the design of any reactor 
and other equipment or the design of' any reactor 
which utilizes materials f'urnished by the United States. 
F. The bilateral agreement with respect to the material 
covered ( comparable to the material to be covered 
in the EURATOM system) permits the Commission to 
require the maintenance and production of' operating 
records and to request and receive reports for the 
purpose of' assisting and insuring accountability 





G. All material covered by the agreement in the custody 
of EURATOM will be subject to the EURATOM safeguard 
system and the provisions of the Agreement for 
Cooperation with EURA.TOM, including the guarantee 
provisions. 
H. Under the principles agreed upon, EURATOM 
undertakes the obligation to assure that materials 
not currently utilized for civil purposes are 
deposited in storage facilities maintained by the 
Community. 
I. Frequent consultations and visits between the parties 
will take place to give assurance to both parties that 
the Community's sat'egUa.rd and control system effectively 
meet responsibilities and principles stated in the Agreement 
and that the standards o:f the materials accountability system 
of the United States and the Community are kept reasonably 
comparable. The United States will. assist the Community in 
G. Materials covered by the agreement in the 
custody of the subject Government or any person 
under its jurisdiction is subject to all the 
safeguards and the guarantees. 
H. Special nuclear material not currently utilized 
for civil purposes is required to be deposited 
in storage facilities designated by the U.S. 
I. The UeS., a.:fter consultation with the subject 
Government may designate personnel accompanied, 
if either party so requests, by personnel of 
the subject Government who shall have access to 
all places and data necessary to account for the 
source and special nuclear material which are 





I. ( Centinued) 
the establisbltent of its system and will provide 
continuing assistance in the operation of' the 
system. The Commission may verify by mutually 
approved scientific methods the effectiveness 
of' the safeguards and controls system established 
by EURATOM and EURATOM may do likewise with respect 
to materials made available to the Commission. 
J. A continuation of' the cooperative program is 
I 
contingent upon Community's establishing and 
\ 
maintaining a mutually satisfactory and 
effective safeguard and control system which 
is in accord with the principles set forth in 
the Agreement. 
.i 
I. ( C&1ntinued) 
The personnel assigned by the U.S. may make 
such independent measurements as it deems 
necessary. 
J. In the event of non-compliance. . ..with- the . 
safeguard provisions of the Agreement or 
the guarantees set forth in the Agreement 
and the failure of' the subject Goyernment 
to carry out the safeguard provisions within 
a reasonable time, the U.S. may suspend or 
terminate the Agreement and require the return 
of any material, equipment and devices subject 










K. Under the exchange of information provisions, 
the parties will consult on matters of 
health and safety. 
L. No express provision dealing with Bilateral L., 
see however Section C of the Agreement concerning 
exchange of visits and consultations and the 
necessity to establishing a mutually satisfactory 
system and Section E of the Agreement providing 
that the cooperative program is contingent 
upon the Community's establishing and maintaining 
a mutuall.y satisfactory system. 
M. The Commission and the Community will consult 
with each other from time to time to determine 
whether there are any areas of responsibility 
with regard to safeguards and controls and matters 
relating to health and safety in which the Agency 
might be asked tu assist. 
K. The United States is to consult with the 
subject Government relating to matters 
of health and safety. 
L. The subject Government undertakes to 
facilitate the application of the safeguards 
set forth in the Agreement. 
M. The Parties will consult to determine in what 
respects if any they desire to modify the provisions 
of the Agreement for Cooperation to arrange for the 
administration by the IAEA of those conditions, 
controls, and safeguards, including those related 
to health and safety standards required by the IAEA' 






M. ( Continued) 
cooperating nation under the aegis of the 
IAEA. In the event the parties do not reach a 
mutuall.y sa~isfactory agreement following 
such consultation, either party may terminate 
the agreement and in the event it is 
terminated the subject Government shall 
return to the Commission all source and 
special nuclear materials received pursuant 
to the Agreement. 
~ 
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